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Abstract. Haskell makes it very easy to build and use Domain Specific
Languages (DSLs). However, it is frequently the case that a DSL has
invariants that can not be easily enforced statically, resulting in runtime
checks. This is a great pity given Haskell’s rich and powerful type system
and leads to all the usual problems of dynamic checking.
We believe that Domain Specific Languages are becoming more popu-
lar: the internet itself is a good example of many DSLs (HTML, CSS,
JavaScript, Flash, etc), and more seem to be being added every day; most
graphics cards already accept programs written in the DSL OpenGL
Shading Language (GLSL); and the predicted growth of heterogeneous
CPUs (for example IBM’s Cell CPU) will demand many different DSLs
for the various programming models and instruction sets that become
available.
We present a technique that allows invariants of any given DSL to be
lifted into the Haskell type system. This removes the need for runtime
checks of the DSL and prevents programs that violate the invariants of
the DSL from ever being compiled or executed. As a result we avoid the
pitfalls of dynamic checking and return the user of the DSL to the safety
and tranquillity of the strongly statically typed Haskell world.
1 Introduction
Algebraic Data Types (ADTs) provide a very easy way to design and build a
Domain Specific Language (DSL) with some degree of type safety. For example,
a simple expression language can be created very easily:
data Expr = Bool Bool | Int Int
| Plus Expr Expr | Times Expr Expr | Eq Expr Expr
However, this does not prevent a Bool being compared for equality (Eq) with an
Int , which we might well want to reject rather than just return false. Even worse,
we can attempt to multiply an Int by a Bool , which we definitely want to reject.
Here the problem is that we have two distinct types, integers and booleans, and
we must limit the constructors to only accepting expressions of the correct type.
Thus we add a type parameter to track the type of the current expression and we
switch to using Generalised Algebraic Data Types (GADTs) [1]. GADTs allow
the precise type signature of a constructor to be specified explicitly. Using a
GADT rather than a number of plain ADTs offers the simplest solution as we
don’t need to build a hierarchy of data types:
data Expr t where
Bool :: Bool → Expr Bool
Int :: Int → Expr Int
Plus :: Expr Int → Expr Int → Expr Int
Times :: Expr Int → Expr Int → Expr Int
Eq :: Expr t → Expr t → Expr Bool
Eq is particularly satisfying here as it allows any two expressions of the same type
to be compared for equality, thus there is no need for separate Eq constructors
for boolean and integer expressions.
If the DSL is to contain statements rather than expressions, and has state,
then things can become rather more tricky. Making further use of GADTs to
model variables and variable creation, and combing these GADTs with the State
monad certainly allows you to statically enforce some invariants. But not all
desired invariants can be enforced with these techniques. For example, consider
a DSL for the assembly language with CPU-registers. The value within a register
has a type, and you may wish to ensure that you can only do sensible type-safe
things with that register. But the register could load another value with another
type, thus the type of the register has to be able to vary. The GADT approach
cannot automatically consider that the register can change type and so would
require explicit constructs in the DSL to permit this. Another example is the
security analysis (the Bell / LaPadula system) that we present in section 5: this
cannot be implemented through GADTs alone.
It is very common then for GADTs and related techniques to be used to
enforce as much as possible, but then for certain checks to be performed at
runtime. This often provides a false sense of security to the user of the DSL as
they may not realise that their DSL-program may be rejected at runtime, and it
also complicates matters significantly for the library writer and DSL-designer as
they must ensure that they check the DSL-program at every necessary point in
the provided API. Forgetting to check the DSL in just one public function may
be enough to expose privileged information or to at least bring down a system.
Further, if the same DSL-program is used in multiple places, the checking would
have to be done multiple times. This could become very expensive if the DSL-
program is large and the checking complex. It should not be difficult to see the
benefits of being able to statically check the DSL-program.
– We present a technique that allows such complex invariants to be statically
checked by lifting the invariants into the Haskell type system.
– We demonstrate our technique with a running example using an extended
form of the While language as our DSL (section 2) which permits both
boolean and numeric variables and for variables to change their type. After
explaining our framework (section 3) we use it to implement type inference
(section 4) and then extend the While language with a security model (Bell
/ LaPadula) which gives secrecy levels to variables and enforces restrictions
on information flow (section 5).
DSLs are not a new technique and have been successfully used for a variety
of applications. SQL is a very widely used DSL for accessing databases and has
Bool ::= True | False
Num ::= 0, 1, 2, . . . ∈ N
Var ::= a, b, c, . . . ∈ V
Expr ::= BoolExpr |NumExpr
Statement ::= skip
| if BoolExpr
then Statements
else Statements
| while BoolExpr
Statements
|Var := Expr
Statements ::= 
| Statement
Statements
BoolExpr ::= Bool
|Var
| not BoolExpr
| or BoolExpr BoolExpr
| and BoolExpr BoolExpr
|NumExpr < NumExpr
|NumExpr > NumExpr
| Expr == Expr
NumExpr ::= Num
|Var
| negate NumExpr
|NumExpr + NumExpr
|NumExpr - NumExpr
|NumExpr * NumExpr
|NumExpr / NumExpr
Fig. 1: The syntax of the While language
been subjected to many techniques to statically enforce its invariants. We discuss
these and other related work in section 6, before concluding in section 7.
2 The While Language
We demonstrate our technique by enforcing invariants on a simple While lan-
guage. The While language is a very basic but general purpose imperative lan-
guage, that is statement based using variable assignment (:=), has typical arith-
metic, boolean and logical functions, and has while and if control flow con-
structs. The if must have both branches specified and there is a no-op instruc-
tion, skip which is typically used in a branch of an if to effectively eliminate
that branch. Using a general purpose language (albeit it a very simple one) as
our DSL demonstrates how general our technique is, and offers evidence that
our techniques can be adapted and used in far more specific DSLs.
The original While language [2] only permitted variables to be assigned nu-
meric expressions and boolean expressions only appeared in the conditions of
while and if statements. We extend the While language so that boolean ex-
pressions can be assigned to variables, and that variables can change their type,
provided it is done in a type safe way. Variables can be created inside blocks and
are lexically scoped.
The syntax of the While language is shown in figure 1. Here the definition uses
separate types for boolean and numeric expressions. This allows the definitions
of monomorphic functions to be specified correctly (e.g. it is not possible to
multiply a number by a boolean), but equality (==), which is polymorphic, is
poorly specified. Typically at this point, the operational semantics would only
define reduction where equality is used in a type-safe way, but we wish to be able
to statically reject such incorrect use of equality as an invariant of the language
rather than as a consequence of the operational semantics. Furthermore, we see
that a Var can be both a numeric or a boolean value and can change type. We
want the type system to reject programs that do unsafe things with variables.
One of the invariants we wish to enforce is that a variable can never be of
an ambiguous type: that is, a variable can not change type within the body of
a while loop (as the while loop may never be entered) and if it changes type
within an if statement then both branches must result in the variable being the
same type. This is a slightly stronger property than is absolutely necessary: it
could be legal to change the type of variable within the body of a while loop or
for an if statement to leave a variable with two types (or more, given nestings),
provided that the variable is subsequently only assigned to and not read from.
This would require a def-use analysis which is possible to implement with our
technique, however, here we enforce only the simpler property.
With GADTs alone, you could implement many of these invariants statically.
However, frequently the DSL would have to be extended to support additional
operations directly, for example adding explicit constructs to change the type
of a variable, which somewhat goes against the notion of type inference, and
additionally makes the DSL larger and more complex. In our opinion, much of
the value of a DSL is in its ease of use and forcing the user to compromise on
this front to facilitate analyses is something to be avoided.
3 Static Analysis Framework
Our aim is to treat the type system as a programming environment as this will
allow us to statically enforce the invariants as required. We shall rely on a library
of functions that we have built, providing type level numbers, lists (which we
frequently treat as sets) and maps and cover their APIs as necessary. Wherever
possible we have tried to copy the APIs from normal value-level libraries such
as Haskell’s Data.List library in order to make these libraries as predictable and
familiar as possible. In many cases, the only difference in use between our type-
level versions and the normal value-level versions are that in using the type-level
version you must put a type class constraint in the context of your function.
When checking a DSL-program, we need to be able to walk over the structure
of the program, collecting information and checking that invariants are satisfied
by each statement. To do this we ensure that the type of one statement depends
upon the type of the preceding statement, thus analysis of the preceding state-
ment must occur before the current statement can be typed. Hence we achieve
type-level computation for each statement. These dependencies are created by
using a type indexed monad:1
1 In this presentation we redefine the standard Haskell Monad type class as shown,
which is legal Haskell 98 but isn’t accepted by GHC prior to version 6.10. For versions
class Monad m where
(>>) :: m x y a → m y z b → m x z b
(>>=) :: m x y a → (a → m y z b)→ m x z b
return :: a → m x x a
Thus the monad has gained two extra type parameters, the first can be thought
of as the from state, and the second can be thought of as the to state. Now we can
see that if we have statements of the While-DSL which are combined together
using these monadic functions, then the type of the second statement must have
a from state equal to the to state of the first statement, thus the dependency is
achieved. It is into these type parameters that we shall place all the state that
we require to check the properties of our DSL.
This monad can very easily be thought of as nothing more than the normal
State monad except that the type of the state can change. The only instance of
this monad that we need is similarly very close to the definition of the standard
State data type in Haskell:
newtype State x y a = State{runState :: x → (a, y)}
instance Monad State where
f >> g = State (λx → let ( , y) = runState f x in runState g y)
f >>= g = State (λx → let (a, y) = runState f x in runState (g a) y)
return a = State (λx → (a, x ))
So, in this framework, all we need is to define a data structure that will form
the from and to states (i.e. the x and y parameters to the State type) and to
define the functions that will allow the user to write a DSL-program.
For the While-DSL, we need to be able to identify variables uniquely at the
type level in order to track their type and check their use. This requires that
each new variable has a different type, and so we use type-level numbers to
identify each variable. Thus the state must contain the next number to be used
for the next variable. This shall be incremented as variables are created. Set
membership is used for tracking the type of each variable. We need three sets to
hold integer variables, boolean variables and newly created variables which have
not yet been assigned to and thus have no type. The functions that we define
which make up the While language will manipulate these sets and types in order
to enforce the invariants as required.
Our framework can produce a value if the invariants of the DSL are satis-
fied, and for the While-DSL, we choose to produce an Abstract Syntax Tree
(AST) of the program that has been supplied. This output is determined by
the DSL-designer, who could equally decide no output is required and just use
the framework for enforcing the DSL’s invariants. We use a very simple ADT to
produce the AST, one which does not enforce the invariants we are interested
in. However, this ADT is never exposed to the user so is considered safe to use
internally within the library. In this way, our framework acts as the bridge be-
tween the unsafe external world, statically rejecting bad DSL-programs, and the
safe, controlled inner world of the library or DSL-designer. The ADT is shown in
of GHC prior to 6.10, we have to rename the monad functions and abandon do-
syntax. Using do-syntax makes the presentation more familiar and simpler.
type Statements
= [Statement ]
data Statement
= Skip
| Var := Expr
| If BoolExpr Statements Statements
| While BoolExpr Statements
deriving (Show ,Eq)
newtype Var
= Var String
deriving (Show ,Eq)
data Expr
= Boolean BoolExpr
| Integer IntExpr
deriving (Show ,Eq)
data BoolExpr
= BoolTerm Bool
| BoolVar Var
| Not BoolExpr
| Or BoolExpr BoolExpr
| And BoolExpr BoolExpr
| Eq Expr Expr
| LT IntExpr IntExpr
| GT IntExpr IntExpr
deriving (Show ,Eq)
data IntExpr
= IntTerm Int
| IntVar Var
| Negate IntExpr
| IntExpr :+: IntExpr
| IntExpr :∗: IntExpr
| IntExpr :/: IntExpr
| IntExpr :−: IntExpr
deriving (Show ,Eq)
Fig. 2: The Algebraic Data Type of the While-DSL
figure 2 and is extremely similar to the syntax of the While language in figure 1.
From this ADT, it is straightforward to write an interpreter for the While-DSL
which walks over the AST, if that is what the DSL-designer desires.
To create the AST, we need to be able to convert variables that are identi-
fied by types into Strings, i.e. when a variable is created, it will have a unique
identifying type (a type-level number), e.g. D5 E , but it will also have a name
which is a String, for example "f". Our type-level numbers support converting
a type-level number to an Int , so we have a Map from Ints to Strings which will
allow us to convert a variable as a type to its name for use in the AST, a list
of Strings to act as a source of value-level names for the variables, and a list of
Statements which will form the resulting AST of the While-program. So, as the
While-DSL designer, we define the state as:
data DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars
= DS{names :: [String ],
nameMap :: Map Int String ,
statements :: AST .Statements,
nextVar :: nextVar ,
unusedVars :: unusedVars,
boolVars :: boolVars,
intVars :: intVars }
and our functions will therefore be variations upon the type:
State (DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars)
(DSLState nextVar ′ unusedVars ′ boolVars ′ intVars ′) result
permitting the types that hold the state we are interested in to vary as necessary.
It is the relationships between these type parameters, enforced through type class
contexts, which will allow the calculation of the to state from the from state,
and will either accept or reject the provided While-program.
To run the framework, we need an initial state from which analysis will
begin and a function that will supplies the initial state to the analysis. Con-
sidering the purpose of each component of the state, the initial state is clear:
the nextVar will be a type level number of zero (represented by D0 E ), and
the unusedVars, boolVars and intVars are all the empty list (Nil). We define
the function buildWithInvariants, which applies this initial state to the While
program supplied, and produces the AST as the output:
buildWithInvariants :: State (DSLState (D0 E ) Nil Nil Nil)
(DSLState nextVar Nil boolVars intVars) ()→
AST .Statements
buildWithInvariants prog = statements (snd (runState prog initialState))
where
initialState = DS{names = names,
nameMap = Map.empty ,
statements = [ ],
nextVar = (D0 E ),
unusedVars = nil ,
boolVars = nil ,
intVars = nil }
names = [[x ] | x ← [’a’ . . ’z’]] ++
[reverse (x : y) | y ← names, x ← [’a’ . . ’z’]]
4 Type Inference
As the While-DSL designer and invariant enforcer, there are just five functions
we need to implement: the four statements of the While-DSL and the ability to
create new variables. The easiest of these is the skip statement which has no
impact on typing whatsoever as it is a no-op. The implementation is very simple:
skip :: State (DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars)
(DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars) ()
skip = State f
where
f ds@(DS{statements })
= ((), ds{statements = statements ++ [AST .Skip ]})
Next we tackle creating a new variable. We need to increment the type
nextVar , return and insert the old value into the unusedVars set, and create
a corresponding value-level representation of the variable, as a String , shown
in figure 3. Num is our module for type-level numbers and we see that to find
the successor of a number is nothing more than putting the Succ type class in
the context of our function. Similarly, with the NumberToInt type class (and
corresponding numberToInt function), which converts a type-level number to an
newVar :: ∀ nextVar nextVar ′ unusedVars unusedVars ′ boolVars intVars .
(Num.Succ nextVar nextVar ′,
SetCons nextVar unusedVars unusedVars ′,
NumberToInt nextVar)⇒
State (DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars)
(DSLState nextVar ′ unusedVars ′ boolVars intVars) nextVar
newVar = State f
where
f :: (DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars)→
(nextVar , (DSLState nextVar ′ unusedVars ′ boolVars intVars))
f ds@(DS{names = (name : names),nameMap,nextVar , unusedVars })
= (nextVar , ds{names = names,nameMap = nameMap′,
nextVar = nextVar ′, unusedVars = unusedVars ′})
where
nameMap′ = Map.insert varNum name nameMap
nextVar ′ = Num.succ nextVar
varNum = numberToInt nextVar
unusedVars ′ = setCons nextVar unusedVars
Fig. 3: Creating a new variable
Int , and the SetCons type class which operates on type-level lists, performing a
cons as normal except when the element is already a member of the list, thus a
list constructed in this way will not contain duplicates.
The three remaining functions (:=, while and if) all involve expressions so
it is these we must tackle next. When a variable is used in an expression we do
not know whether its current value is a boolean or integer, but the expression
in which it is used demands that the variable’s value is a particular type. Thus
we need to check that the variable’s current type, held in the type-level sets in
the state, matches the use of the variable in the expression. A straightforward
expression ADT would simply give us a value of type Expression which would
be useless to us as a type, as we need a much richer type to be able to verify that
variables are used correctly. Thus we use a GADT to build an expression such
that the type of the expression contains the variables and the way in which they
are used. Our idea is that the expression GADT has a type parameter which
represents a stack, such that every element of the stack is a tuple, where the left
of the tuple is the desired type, and the right of the tuple is a list of variables
which are required to have the type on the left. For example:
Cons (Int , (Cons X (Cons Y Nil))) (Cons (Bool ,Cons Z Nil) Nil)
is a type-level stack in which X and Y are variables which we need to be Ints
and Z is a variable we need to be a Bool .2 The expression GADT has three type
parameters, the last of which is this stack structure, and the other two are noth-
ing more than the head of the stack, decomposed, which simplifies construction
of the stack. The Expr GADT is shown in figure 4.3
2 Cons is the type-level equivalent of (:), just as Nil is the type-level equivalent of [ ].
3 Append is a type-level version of (++).
data Expr ty vars stack where
BC :: Bool → Expr Bool Nil Nil
IC :: Int → Expr Int Nil Nil
Var :: (NumberToInt v)⇒ v → Expr ty (Cons v Nil) Nil
Not :: Expr Bool vars stack → Expr Bool Nil (Cons (Bool , vars) stack)
And :: (Append vars vars ′ vars ′′,Append stack stack ′ stack ′′)⇒
Expr Bool vars stack → Expr Bool vars ′ stack ′ →
Expr Bool Nil (Cons (Bool , vars ′′) stack ′′)
Or :: ... -- as for And
Eq :: (Append vars vars ′ vars ′′,Append stack stack ′ stack ′′)⇒
Expr ty vars stack → Expr ty vars ′ stack ′ →
Expr Bool Nil (Cons (ty , vars ′′) stack ′′)
LT :: (Append vars vars ′ vars ′′,Append stack stack ′ stack ′′)⇒
Expr Int vars stack → Expr Int vars ′ stack ′ →
Expr Bool Nil (Cons (Int , vars ′′) stack ′′)
GT :: ... -- as for LT
Negate :: Expr Int vars stack → Expr Int Nil (Cons (Int , vars) stack)
Plus :: (Append vars vars ′ vars ′′,Append stack stack ′ stack ′′)⇒
Expr Int vars stack → Expr Int vars ′ stack ′ →
Expr Int Nil (Cons (Int , vars ′′) stack ′′)
Minus,Times,Divide :: ... -- as for Plus
Fig. 4: The Expr GADT
Thus we see the constructors for constants (BC and IC ), being leaves of the
expression tree, have an empty stack and do not use variables. Using a variable
is achieved with the Var constructor, which is also a leaf of the expression tree
so we construct just a singleton list of the variable, but we don’t know at this
point the type which the variable is expected to have, thus we leave the type
floating as ty . The And constructor takes two sub-expressions which must both
produce Bools, we combine both the subexpressions’ lists of variables, and their
stacks. Thus in the expression And (Var a) (Not (Var b)) the variable a would
be in the vars type parameter for the left child of And , so would be placed
on the top of the stack by the And constructor, whereas the variable b would
already be in the stack, having been placed there by the Not constructor. Thus
this GADT only applies types to variables which are direct children of any given
constructor, which is what we, as the DSL-designer, require. Eq is polymorphic,
merely requiring the subexpressions are the same type. The result of equality is
a Bool ; and when building the stack, we use the common ty type variable of the
subexpressions. This means that the expression Eq (Var a) (Var b) does not
have a ground type as the type of the variables a and b are not fully known:
they could both be Bools or Ints.
Type checking is then quite simple as we only need to walk over the stack
and check that the variables used are members of the correct sets of variables:
class ValidVarUse stack boolVars intVars
instance ValidVarUse Nil boolVars intVars
instance (ValidVarUse stack boolVars intVars,
IsSubList (Cons v vars) intVars isInt ,
IsSubList (Cons v vars) boolVars isBool ,
Bool .Not isInt isBool ,Bool .If isBool Bool Int ty)⇒
ValidVarUse (Cons (ty , (Cons v vars)) stack) boolVars intVars
instance (ValidVarUse varStack boolVars intVars)⇒
ValidVarUse (Cons (ty ,Nil) varStack) boolVars intVars
We recurse over the stack, and for each element we have two cases, for when
variables have and have not been used. The lack of a ground type for certain
expressions means that we can’t match Bool or Int on the type parameter ty at
the head of the stack as ty may be unknown. Instead, we reason that the variables
must be a sublist of either the booleans or the integers but not both (achieved
through the Not relation), and then we require that if they are a sublist of the
booleans then ty must be Bool otherwise it must be Int ; the Bool .If c t f r
class context should be read as r = if c then t else f . IsSubList and the Bool
module are both provided by our libraries of type-level functions.
For assignment we need one further type class (called TypeVar) which up-
dates the sets of variables correctly. The variable being assigned to is removed
from its current set and inserted into the set corresponding to the type of the
expression. Sadly, this can’t be implemented quite this simply as it is a chal-
lenge to make GHC understand that removing an element from a set and then
adding it straight back in results in the same original set (a property we need for
showing that the body of a while loop does not alter the type of any variables),
thus we have to do some set membership tests first. The type class is other-
wise straightforward. Assignment then checks that the expression uses variables
correctly (the ValidVarUse type class), it updates the type of the variable be-
ing assigned to (the TypeVar type class), and it suitably adds to the list of
Statements for the AST (which requires the NumberToInt type class and also
the NumberListToIntList type class which is a mapping of the former over a
list of type-level numbers). The conversion from the Expr GADT to the AST is
entirely mechanical. The type of assignment is therefore:
(.=) :: (TypeVar var ty unusedVars boolVars intVars
unusedVars ′ boolVars ′ intVars ′,
ValidVarUse (Cons (ty , vars) stack) boolVars intVars,
NumberToInt var ,
NumberListToIntList boolVars,NumberListToIntList intVars)⇒
var → Expr ty vars stack →
State (DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars)
(DSLState nextVar unusedVars ′ boolVars ′ intVars ′) ()
var .= expr = ...
The if and while statements are very similar so we only present the while
statement as it is the simpler of the two. The expression is type checked as
for assignment. The body may create lexically scoped variables, so variables
that are created within the body must not escape into the outer scope. We
create a type class RemoveVars which takes the range of variables created (i.e.
nextVar to nextVar ′) and removes variables within that range from the sets of
variables. Finally, we require that after removing variables created within the
body, the body results in the same sets of variables with the same type as were
initially supplied. Thus the body cannot leave a variable in a different type than
it was before the while statement. The body of the function is not enormously
interesting, whereas the type is.
while :: (ValidVarUse (Cons (Bool , vars) stack) boolVars intVars,
RemoveVars nextVar nextVar ′ unusedVars ′ boolVars ′ intVars ′
unusedVars boolVars intVars,
NumberListToIntList boolVars,NumberListToIntList intVars)⇒
Expr Bool vars stack →
(State (DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars)
(DSLState nextVar ′ unusedVars ′ boolVars ′ intVars ′) ())→
(State (DSLState nextVar unusedVars boolVars intVars)
(DSLState nextVar ′ unusedVars boolVars intVars) ())
while cond body = ...
In Haskell, if is a keyword so cannot be redefined, so we instead call the
function ifw . This function uses all the same machinery, just slightly differently.
The two bodies of the if statement can leave variables with different types than
before the if statement, provided they both make the same changes.
And that is it: in under 400 lines of Haskell specific to the While-DSL, we
can now write While programs, supply them to the buildWithInvariants function,
and if no error occurs, know that the invariants of the language were statically
checked and a simple AST of the program is returned. The code is not partic-
ularly complex, and whilst it is more verbose than equivalent runtime checks,
the advantages of statically asserting these invariants more than outweighs the
extra code size.
5 Extending While with Security
To demonstrate how flexible and extensible this framework is, we extend the
While-DSL with the Bell / LaPadula security model [3], which constrains infor-
mation flow. Variables are given security categories such as public or top-secret,
which are totally-ordered, and the system ensures that no read-ups or write-
downs occur. These can happen in assignments where the expression on the
right of the assignment reads a variable which has a higher security level (so
a read-up) than the variable to which the expression is being assigned (and so
represents an information leak) and viewing it the other way around, it is also
a write-down as privileged information is being written down to a lower level.
But it doesn’t just occur in assignments: the condition of a while or if state-
ment imposes a minimum security level on the bodies of those statements for
the very fact that a body is being executed reveals information about the condi-
tional. Thus every statement within the body must be at the same security level
or higher than is required to read the variables within the conditional expres-
sion. This analysis could, for example, be used to ensure that data read from a
database is never directly returned to a user, or that passwords are never held
by user-visible variables.
Our implementation extends this further: when a variable is created, we pro-
vide two security levels, a minimum and a maximum. These can be the same
value, in which case checking is performed as described above. However, the
minimum value can be less than the maximum and indicates that we’re not sure
what the security level of the variable should be. The maximum level will not
change, and so if the program is rejected then we know that some variable is not
sufficiently privileged given the maximum security levels, but the minimum level
can rise, which indicates that the variable must be granted at least the resulting
minimum level for the program to be acceptable. The maximum level is used
when reading a variable, and the minimum level is used when writing to a vari-
able. Thus raising the minimum security level is always a safe operation, because
it only increases what can be written to a variable but does not alter who can
read that variable. So raising the minimum level of a variable cannot invalidate
assignments or conditionals that have already been checked. Our security levels
are type-level numbers, where zero (D0 E ) is the lowest possible level.
To implement this security analysis, we need to extend the type-level state.
We need to carry around a minimum security level: this is set by if and while
conditionals and represents the minimum security level a variable must have to be
assigned to within such a statement. We also need a type-level map (provided by
our TMap module), from variables to tuples representing the current minimum
and maximum security level. The skip statement has no security implications
and so is unaltered. Creating a new variable is as before, except it inserts the
minimum-maximum tuple into the security map, and we check the minimum is
less than the maximum. Expressions already expose in their type all the variables
that are used, so we once again need to be able to walk this structure and extract
the highest maximum security level, which we will use as the read level of the
expression. This is the purpose of the MaxSecurityLevel type class:
class MaxSecurityLevel map varStack maxIn maxOut
| map varStack maxIn → maxOut where
maxSecurityLevel :: map → varStack → maxIn → maxOut
The instances of this type class walk first over the stack of tuples and then over
the inner lists of variables, indexing the map and testing to see if the maximum
security level of each variable is greater than the current security level (held by
maxIn). The maximum level found is returned in maxOut .
Assignment then uses the MaxSecurityLevel , finding the read level of the ex-
pression (exprMax ). We check to see if this is lower than the minimum level
currently held by the state (minExpr), if so, the state’s level is used it its place.
This ensures that if the conditional of an if or while statement uses variables
at a particular level (and hence updates the state to hold that level) then as-
signments within the bodies of those statements must be valid for at least the
same security level, if not higher. The variable to which we are assigning must
have a minimum level greater than or equal to the read level. If this is not the
case then we attempt to raise its minimum level sufficiently, but enforce that
this must still remain below its maximum level. Finally we update the security
map (sMap) with the new security levels. The additional type class contexts are
shown below in black and the existing previous code in grey:
(.=)::(TypeVar var ty unused bools ints unused ′ bools ′ ints ′,
ValidVarUse (Cons (ty , vars) stack) bools ints,
NumberToInt var ,
NumberListToIntList bool ,NumberListToIntList ints,
MaxSecurityLevel sMap (Cons (ty , vars) stack) (D0 E ) exprMax ,
IsSmallerThan exprMax minExpr exprMaxSmallerThanMin,
Bool .If exprMaxSmallerThanMin minExpr exprMax exprMax ′,
TMap.Lookup sMap var (varMin, varMax ),
IsSmallerThan varMin exprMax ′ varMinNeedsRaising ,
Bool .If varMinNeedsRaising exprMax ′ varMin varMin ′,
SmallerThanOrEq varMin ′ varMax ,
TMap.UpdateVarying sMap var (varMin ′, varMax ) sMap′)⇒
var → Expr ty vars stack →
State (DSLState nextVar unused bools ints sMap minExpr)
(DSLState nextVar unused ′ bools ′ ints ′ sMap′ minExpr) ()
var .= expr = ...
The if and while statements are again very similar. They extract the read
level of the conditional, exprMax , find the maximum of that value and the level
currently held by the state (to ensure the minimum level isn’t decreased by
nested statements), minExpr ′, and update the state used for their bodies with
this value. Thus the final security map, sMap′, contains the security requirements
of the bodies, which were built using the updated minimum expression level.
while::(ValidVarUse (Cons (Bool , vars) stack) bools ints,
RemoveVars nextVar nextVar ′ unused ′ bools ′ ints ′
unused bools ints,
NumberListToIntList boolVars,NumberListToIntList intVars,
MaxSecurityLevel sMap (Cons (Bool , vars) stack) (D0 E ) exprMax ,
IsSmallerThan minExpr exprMax minExprNeedsRaising ,
Bool .If minExprNeedsRaising exprMax minExpr minExpr ′)⇒
Expr Bool vars stack →
(State (DSLState nextVar unused bools ints sMap minExpr ′)
(DSLState nextVar ′ unused ′ bools ′ ints ′ sMap′ minExpr ′′) ())→
(State (DSLState nextVar unused bools ints sMap minExpr)
(DSLState nextVar ′ unused bools ints sMap′ minExpr) ())
while cond body = ...
Finally, we alter the buildWithInvariants function so that it returns not only
the AST of the While program, but also the security map, converted to a normal
Data.Map value. Thus adding just two further parameters to the DSLState, and
a few additional type class contexts where necessary, has allowed us to extend
the type inference machinery to enforce a powerful and useful security model.
6 Related Work
This work arose out of the irritation of using DSLs without sufficient static
checking. Although we have developed our own type-level libraries as necessary,
most of the functionality and design is very similar to previous type-level pro-
gramming work [4].
Structured Query Language (SQL) is probably both the most widely used and
most reviled DSL. It is used to access database systems from within a program.
The most common embedding of SQL is as a plain string resulting in convoluted
programs that build up an SQL string as a result of user input. The SQL string is
not statically checked, no invariants of the language are statically enforced, and
frequently errors are only discovered at runtime when a database rejects an SQL
string. SQL has seen some more advanced embeddings, such as the HaskellDB
project [5, 6]. More recently, the Microsoft LINQ .Net extension [7] has created a
type-safe general purpose query language which allows the programmer to query
not only databases but in-memory data structures too.
The OpenGL Shading Language (GLSL) [8] is also widely used as it allows
programs to be run directly on a GPU. GLSL is based on ANSI C and is typ-
ically dynamically compiled by the graphics card driver. Similarly to a na¨ıve
embedding of SQL, errors are left to be discovered at runtime.
It has been shown in [9] that by using Phantom Types (which we have made
extensive use of in this work through GADTs), a monomorphic higher-order
language can be embedded into Haskell in such a way that type soundness and
completeness are achieved: i.e. an ill-typed program in the monomorphic higher-
order language cannot be represented by the embedding and a well-typed pro-
gram in the monomorphic higher-order language can always be represented by
the embedding. Whilst our work offers no formal proofs, we do cater for poly-
morphic functions (equality), linear type inference (in that variables can change
type), and work with an imperative language that is further away from Haskell
than the λ-calculus as presented in their work.
Lava [10] is a DSL embedded in Haskell which caters for circuit design with
support for simulation and verification of electronic circuits, in addition to tra-
ditional hardware design tools. The library takes advantage of Haskell’s type
classes to permit easy extension of the library and to enforce type safety. How-
ever, the basic type used is a representation of a bit or a number. Desired circuit
invariants are supported through its verification mechanisms which makes use
of external theorem provers. It would be very interesting to explore how our
framework could allow circuit designers to enforce some invariants of their cir-
cuits without resorting to external theorem provers and what the advantages
and disadvantages of each approach are.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The convenience and power of embedding DSLs within a language make them
an attractive and widely used technique. Statically enforcing their invariants
increases this appeal as it makes using a DSL more robust, reduces unexpected
surprises for Haskell programmers, and makes designing and implementing a DSL
less error prone. We have presented a flexible technique for lifting the invariants
of a DSL into the Haskell type system and demonstrated how our framework can
be used to statically enforce invariants relating to type checking and inference,
and the Bell / LaPadula security model.
The analyses presented here have only required that the type of each state-
ment depends on the type of the previous statement. Analyses which reach fixed
points (for example, live-variable analysis), require that the type of a statement
depends on the types of all preceding (or succeeding) statements as defined by
the control flow graph rather than just the list of statements. This control-flow
graph case is more complex, though we believe it is possible with our technique.
We hope to explore these analyses in the future.
This work only uses functional dependencies as a means to perform type level
computation. Associated data types and synonyms are a new addition to GHC
and provide for type level computation but in a more flexible and less verbose
way than functional dependencies. We hope to explore the use of associated data
types and synonyms in the near future.
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